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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
THOMAS W. SCHNOOR, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 900330-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to 
Rule 26(2)(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1991), and Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1991), whereby a defendant in a 
district court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of 
Appeals from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other 
than a first degree or capital felony. 
RULES. STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following rules, statutes and 
constitutional provisions are provided in Addendum E: 
Standard 3-5.8, ABA Standards Relating to the 
Administration of Criminal Justice (1979); 
Amendment XIV, Constitution of the United States; 
Article I, § 7, Constitution of the State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the prosecutor's inaction in the face of false 
testimony from his primary witness concerning immunity from 
prosecution violate Mr. Schnoor#s right to due process of law? 
Standard of Review; A conviction obtained 
through the use of false evidence must be 
reversed "if there is any reasonable likelihood 
that the false testimony could have affected the 
judgment of the jury." Walker v. State. 674 P.2d 
687, 690-91 (Utah 1981). 
2. Did the prosecutor's action constitute misconduct 
denying Mr. Schnoor the right to a fair trial? 
Standard of Review; Objectionable actions of the 
prosecutor warrant reversal of the conviction if, 
first, "the remarks call to the attention of the 
jurors matters they would not be justified in 
considering in determining their verdict" and, 
second, were the jurors "probably influenced by 
those remarks." State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 
(Utah 1984). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
Forgery, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-501 (1953 as amended). A trial was held on May 1 and 2, 
1990. The jury convicted Mr. Schnoor as charged. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant/Appellant Thomas W. Schnoor was charged by 
Information with Forgery, a second degree felony (R. 6-7). A 
preliminary hearing was held on March 29, 1990 (R. 10), and Brent 
Lindsey was the lone witness to testify for the State (R. 3, 
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10-11). Prior to Mr. Lindsey's testimony, Defendant pointed out 
that Mr. Lindsey was a suspect and should not be forced to testify 
lest he incriminate himself (R. 10). At that point, the State 
stated for the record that it would not charge Mr. Lindsey with any 
crime (R. 3, 10), and the court stated that it would hold the State 
to that promise (R. 3, 11). Brenda Lindsey testified for Defendant 
(R. 3, 11). 
A trial was held on May 1 and 2, 1990 (R. 79, Transcript of 
the Trial). Mr. Schnoor testified at trial that he knew Brent and 
Brenda Lindsey through their mother and acted as their father or big 
brother (R. 79 at 147). Although he did not live with them, he was 
romantically involved with their mother and was over at their 
apartment often (R. 79 at 157-58). He would also occasionally 
provide financial support (R. 79 at 158). On January 24, 1990, 
Mr. Schnoor took Brent and Brenda with him to his work at Huish 
Chemicals to pick up his paycheck (R. 79 at 148-49). He had done 
this several times in the past (R. 79 at 148). 
The next day, Mr. Schnoor called Brent and asked Brent if 
he and Brenda wanted to come along with him that afternoon when he 
paid his bills (R. 79 at 150-51). That afternoon, he picked the two 
up and went to pay some bills (R. 79 at 152). Brent told 
Mr. Schnoor that he had a check to cash but that he had no 
identification with him (R. 79 at 152). Mr. Schnoor took Brent to 
Mike's Pawn (Id.). Both Brent and Mr. Schnoor went into the pawn 
shop, while Brenda stayed in the car (R. 79 at 153). Mr. Schnoor 
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picked up a television set, while Brent unsuccessfully tried to cash 
the check (R. 79 at 153). 
Mr. Schnoor, Brent and Brenda returned to their apartment, 
where Mr. Schnoor made several phone calls trying to find a place 
that would cash Brent's check (R. 79 at 153-54). Mr. Schnoor 
dropped Brent off at a check cashing place near 2100 South and State 
Street (R. 79 at 154) and took Brenda back home (R. 79 at 155). 
Brent told Mr. Schnoor that he would take a bus home (R. 79 at 155). 
No witness other than Mr. Schnoor testified during 
Defendant's case. Testifying for the State were both Brent and 
Brenda Lindsey and four other witnesses. Robert Saupe testified 
that the check in question was his paycheck from Huish Chemical 
(R. 79 at 102-03) but that he did not know Defendant at all (R. 79 
at 103). Lins Young, the manager of Cash-A-Check, testified as to 
the activities of Brent Lindsey in her store; however, she never saw 
Defendant (R. 79 at 107-116). Officer Remik testified as to her 
interaction with Brent Lindsey; she, also, never encountered 
Defendant (R. 79 at 117-124). Finally, Jack Lords testified that he 
knew Mr. Schnoor and saw him in the store while Brent Lindsey was 
there, but that he had no memory of why Defendant was in his store 
or if he was connected to Brent (R. 79 at 128-29). 
Brent Lindsey testified to the same basic outline of 
occurrences as Defendant did. However, Brent said that in the phone 
call from Mr. Schnoor earlier in the day, Mr. Schnoor had promised 
to pay him fifty dollars (R. 79 at 19-20). Prior to going into the 
pawn shop, Brent said that Mr. Schnoor showed him the check, told 
- 4 -
him to memorize the name on it, and go in to cash it (R. 79 at 
22-23). Brent said Mr. Schnoor also told him not to mention his 
name (R. 79 at 24-25). 
In the pawn shop, Brent misspelled Mr. Saupe's name and 
could not cash the check (R. 79 at 26). In addition to making phone 
calls at their apartment, Brent testified that Mr. Schnoor ordered 
Brenda to get him some scissors to cut the misspelled name off of 
the check (R. 79 at 33-34). 
Brent further testified that Mr. Schnoor gave him 
instructions on what to do, while he, Brenda and Mr. Schnoor were 
parked in front of the check cashing place (R. 79 at 35-36). He 
then explained the problems that arose in the store (R. 79 at 36-37) 
and his interaction with Officer Demik (R. 79 at 38). 
On cross-examination, Brent denied that he had been granted 
immunity (R. 79 at 44-47), and no attempt was made by Mr. Morgan to 
correct this erroneous testimony. (See R. 79 at 58-61, redirect of 
witness by Mr. Morgan.) 
Brenda testified to her lack of knowledge of what went on 
in either the pawn shop or check cashing establishment (R. 79 at 
73-74, 80). However, she corroborated Brent's testimony concerning 
Mr. Schnoor's instructions to Brent prior to each attempt (R. 79 at 
70-73, 79-80). She also corroborated Brent's story about the 
scissors (R. 79 at 78). 
Brenda admitted on cross-examination that she had 
previously told defense counsel that Brent found the check at Huish 
Chemical, while Mr. Schnoor was there to pick up his check (R. 79 at 
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89-90). She admitted that she had told him that Brent did this on 
his own (Id.). 
In closing argument, the Deputy County Attorney, Kent 
Morgan, started with an appeal to the jury to protect Brent Lindsey 
(R. 79 at 202) and stated that the case was an unusually important 
one (R. 79 at 203). He further offered his personal opinion that 
Mr. Schnoor was the guilty party (R. 79 at 205), stated that Brent's 
trial would be for another day (R. 79 at 206), and asked the jury 
not let let him down (Id.). In rebuttal, he argued that Brent was 
credible because he had so much to lose, yet decided to tell the 
truth and incriminate himself (R. 79 at 215). 
The case was presented to the jury, who, after 
deliberating, convicted Mr. Schnoor of Forgery. This appeal 
followed. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The State's main witness at trial against Defendant falsely 
testified that he had not been granted immunity. The prosecutor 
took no steps to correct this false and prejudicial impression left 
with the jury and, in fact, argued the false evidence to the jury 
with objections during cross-examination of that witness and in 
closing. The trial court instructed in such a way as to emphasize 
the false testimony. 
Additionally, the prosecutor made numerous objectionable 
statements and asked improper questions during trial. These 
included remarks that drew attention to the above-mentioned false 
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testimony. During cross-examination of Defendant, he asked 
Mr. Schnoor if another witness was lying, making improper argument 
to the jury. And finally, in closing argument the prosecutor made 
comments that asked the jury to use improper considerations in 
coming to its verdict, used arguments designed to inflame the jury, 
and expressed improper personal opinions. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEYS INACTION 
IN THE FACE OF FALSE TESTIMONY FROM HIS PRIMARY 
WITNESS CONCERNING IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION 
VIOLATED MR. SCHNOOR'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF 
LAW. 
At the preliminary hearing, Brent Lindsey, the State's only 
witness at that hearing and a primary participant in the alleged 
illegal activities, was granted immunity from prosecution by the 
State through Deputy County Attorney Marty Verhoef (R. 3-4, 10-11, 
attached as "Addendum A"). At trial, Brent was cross-examined for 
an extended period of time concerning this grant of immunity (R. 79 
at 44-47): 
MR. GRINDSTAFF: AND YOU WERE PROMISED YOU 
WOULDN'T GO TO JAIL, RIGHT, IF YOU CAME AND 
TESTIFIED AGAINST TOM? 
BRENT LINDSEY: IF I WHAT? — I DON'T GET 
IT. 
Q. WEREN'T THERE PROMISES MADE TO YOU? 
A. NO. 
Q. NO? HAVE YOU BEEN CHARGED WITH THE 
CRIME? HAVE YOU HAD TO GO TO THE DETENTION 
CENTER? 
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A. NO. OH, YES, ONCE. 
Q. THAT WAS RIGHT AFTER YOU WERE 
ARRESTED; RIGHT? 
A. A FEW WEEKS — ABOUT A WEEK LATER. 
Q. ABOUT A WEEK LATER YOU WENT TO COURT; 
RIGHT? 
A. YES. 
A. WELL, IT'S NOT REALLY COURT. IT WAS — 
Q. YOU WENT AND MET WITH POLICE OFFICERS? 
A. I DON'T KNOW IF IT WAS A POLICE 
OFFICER. 
Q. PROBATION OFFICER? FROM THE JUVENILE 
SYSTEM? 
A. I THINK THAT'S WHAT IT WAS. 
Q. DID THEY PROMISE YOU THAT IF YOU 
TESTIFIED AGAINST TOM, THEY WOULDN'T PRESS ANY 
CHARGES AGAINST YOU? 
A. NO. NO, THEY DIDN'T. 
Q. HAVE THEY PRESSED CHARGES AGAINST YOU? 
MR. MORGAN: WE ARE PROCEEDING IN BAD 
FAITH. AT THIS POINT ALL OF THAT HAS BEEN 
ANSWERED. 
MR. GRINDSTAFF: I DON'T BELIEVE HE'S 
ANSWERED THAT QUESTION. 
THE COURT: HE CAN ANSWER THAT QUESTION. 
THE WITNESS: WILL YOU REPEAT IT? 
Q. HAVE THERE BEEN CHARGES PRESSED 
AGAINST YOU? 
A. UM, NO. 
Q. NO. AND WHY HAVEN'T THERE BEEN 
CHARGES PRESSED AGAINST YOU? 
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MR. MORGAN: OBJECTION. BEYOND THE 
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE WITNESS. AS PHRASED. 
THE COURT: YOU CAN ANSWER THE QUESTION, 
IF YOU KNOW. 
THE WITNESS: I DON'T KNOW. 
Q. YOU DON'T KNOW WHETHER OR NOT YOU 
HAVEN'T BE (SIC) CHARGED BECAUSE OF YOUR 
TESTIMONY IN THIS CASE? 
A. YES, I DON'T KNOW. 
Q. YOU DON'T KNOW. YOU WERE IN COURT FOR 
A PRELIMINARY HEARING, WEREN'T YOU? AND DIDN'T 
YOU HEAR THE PROSECUTOR REPRESENT TO YOU THAT 
THEY WOULD NOT FILE CHARGES AGAINST YOU? FOR 
YOUR TESTIMONY? 
A. I CAN'T REMEMBER. 
Q. ISN'T THAT WHAT HAPPENED? 
MR. MORGAN: OBJECTION, YOUR HONOR. MAY 
WE APPROACH THE BENCH? 
THE COURT: YOU MAY. 
(BENCH CONFERENCE OFF THE RECORD) 
MR. GRINDSTAFF: NOW, HAVE YOU BEEN TOLD 
THAT IF YOU DIDN'T TESTIMONY (SIC) THAT YOU WOULD 
GO TO JAIL? 
A. NO. 
Q. NO? ABOUT A MONTH AND A HALF AGO, 
WASN'T IT TRUE THAT YOU AND YOUR SISTER SAT IN A 
ROOM WITH A POLICE OFFICER AND YOU TWO WERE TOLD 
THAT IF YOU DIDN'T COME OVER AND TESTIFY AGAINST 
TOM — 
MR. MORGAN: OBJECTION. THIS IS GETTING 
ARGUMENTATIVE AND — I MEAN, HE'S ASKED ~ EACH 
TIME THE WITNESS HAS ANSWERED EACH TIME THAT HE 
HAS NOT BEEN OFFERED ANYTHING IN THIS CASE. NOW 
WE ARE GOING THROUGH TESTIMONY, I THINK, THAT IS 
GOING WAY COLLATERAL TO ANY ISSUES HERE. 
9 -
THE COURT: WELL, I'M GOING TO OVERRULE 
THE OBJECTION ON THE PRESUMPTION THAT A THE 
QUESTION IS ASKED IF GOOD FAITH. 
• • • 
Trial counsel for the State, Deputy County Attorney Kent 
Morgan, made no effort to clear up this incorrect testimony from his 
primary witness. And, in fact, he affirmatively argued from this 
testimony on several occasions in his closing: "Brent is not on 
trial. That is for another day." (R. 79 at 206); and, "[N]ow, his 
testimony was that he was not promised anything, but by admitting 
his participation in this crime, therefore, he's going to 
detention? . . . He incriminates himself all the away (sic) through 
the case." (R. 79-at 214-15). 
Furthermore, the court instructed the jury in instruction 
number seven that 
[a]lthough there is more than one person named in 
this action, the case against each person is 
separate from and independent of that of the 
other. In this action the only defendant on 
trial is Thomas W. Schnoor. You are not to 
concern yourselves with the status of any other 
person or defendant named in the case. 
(R. 32, attached as "Addendum B"). After objections and a bench 
conference concerning the instruction, the court pointed out to the 
jury that the credibility of both Brent and Brenda Lindsey could be 
considered (R. 79 at 198-201). Further objections were overruled 
and a request for a bench conference was denied (R. 79 at 201). 
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A. ERROR AROSE WHEN THE PROSECUTOR ALLOWED FALSE 
EVIDENCE TO BE PRESENTED AND ARGUED THAT SAME 
EVIDENCE TO THE JURY. 
[I]t is established that a conviction 
obtained through use of false evidence, known to 
be such by representatives of the State, must 
fall under the Fourteenth Amendment. The same 
result obtains when the State, although not 
soliciting false evidence, allows it to go 
uncorrected when it appears. 
The principle that a State may not 
knowingly use false evidencef including false 
testimony, to obtain a tainted conviction, 
implicit in any concept of ordered liberty, does 
not cease to apply merely because the false 
testimony goes only to the credibility of a 
witness. 
(citations omitted). Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959); 
see also Gialio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1971). This is 
true "irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution." Gialio at 154 (citation omitted). Convictions thus 
obtained violate not only the fourteenth amendment's due process 
clause, but also Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. 
State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 789 (Utah 1984). 
The government in Gialio had offered immunity to its main 
witness against the defendant through a prosecutor who was not the 
attorney at trial. Gialio at 152-53. At trial, the witness denied 
the existence of a grant of immunity on cross-examination (Id.). In 
closing, the prosecutor argued the lack of promises made by the 
government (Id.). The court in Gialio found this to be error, even 
though the trial attorney had no idea immunity from prosecution had 
been granted to his witness. 
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In the present case, Mr. Verhoef was the State's 
representative when immunity was granted; Mr. Morgan conducted the 
trial. However, whether these turn of events were 
a result of negligence or design, it is the 
responsibility of the prosecutor. The 
prosecutor's office is an entity and as such it 
is the spokesman for the Government. A promise 
made by one attorney must be attributed, for 
these purposes to the Government (citation 
omitted). 
Gialio at 154. It was error even for Mr. Morgan to be unaware of 
the promise of immunity, thus negligently allowing false testimony 
to be presented. 
Although Brent Lindsey did not understand what was being 
asked or did not remember what had happened at the preliminary 
hearing, his testimony nevertheless created a false impression for 
the jury* However, the witness' state of mind was not material to 
either the decision in Napue or Giglio. Unwitting false testimony 
that goes uncorrected violates principles of due process, also. 
Walker v. State. 628 P.2d 680, 681 (Nevada 1981). 
What is important is that the State allowed the evidence to 
go uncorrected. In the present case, the prosecutor not only 
allowed the false impression to go to the jury, but he objected 
repeatedly to defense counsel's attempts to get Brent to acknowledge 
the promise that had been made to him (R. 79 at 44-46), even at one 
point claiming bad faith on Mr. Grindstaff's part, thus compounding 
the error (R. 79 at 44). Not only was the jury led to believe that 
Brent was testifying in spite of the effect that it may have on his 
own trial, but the prosecutor also insinuated that defense counsel 
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was being unfair by making up the whole idea of a promise to Brent 
in exchange for his testimony. 
The prosecutor also argued in closing 
[t]hat Brent is not on trial. That is for 
another day. 
(R. 79 at 206). And 
[h]e incriminates himself all the way through the 
case. 
(R. 79 at 215). The prosecutor's statements hammered through the 
idea that no promises were made and that Brent faced his day in 
court later. The State's emphasis of the false testimony in order 
to enhance the credibility of its main witness enhanced the 
prejudicial nature of this evidence. 
Finally, the State submitted an instruction to the court 
(R. 54) that was later given as instruction number seven (R. 32; see 
Addendum B). This instruction reinforces the false impression left 
in the jurors' minds and places all the authority of the trial court 
behind that impression. There were several objections to this 
instruction, although the record is unclear as to the specific 
nature of the objections, since the side bar conference was never 
put on the record (R. 79 at 198-201). However, it is clear 
Mr. Grindstaff had further objections to the instruction that the 
court overruled without discussion (R. 79 at 201). 
The instruction is in error for several reasons. First, it 
repeats the false impression created by Brent's testimony, and 
suggests that Brent will indeed be tried and punished later. 
Second, it calls attention to a matter affecting the credibility of 
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the State's main witness, adding further to the false testimony's 
prejudicial effect, even though it is asking the jury to disregard 
that information. Third, the instruction fails to give important 
and correct information concerning the credibility of Brent Lindsey. 
B. THE ERROR WAS COMPOUNDED WHEN DEFENSE COUNSEL 
FAILED TO MAKE AN APPROPRIATE RECORD OF THE 
IMMUNITY QUESTION. 
Defense counsel for Mr. Schnoor was present at preliminary 
hearing and trial. At trial, defense counsel attempted to get Brent 
to admit that promises had been made to him (R. 79 at 44-46). Brent 
denied that he had been promised he would not go to jail if he 
testified (R. 79 at 44), that any promises were made (Id.), that no 
charges would be pressed if he testified against Mr. Schnoor (Id.). 
He admitted he did not know if the prosecutor would not file charges 
if he testified (R. 79 at 45). He said he did not remember what 
happened at the preliminary hearing concerning any promises (Id.). 
Brent did not remember, did not understand what had gone on, or was 
not telling the truth about the promise of immunity. 
During this interchange, one bench conference was requested 
by the prosecutor (R. 79 at 45). Nothing from this bench conference 
was put on the record. Counsel for Defendant made no request on the 
record for a continuance to get this preliminary hearing transcript 
or tape into the record and read or played to the jury. Counsel for 
Defendant made no proffer for the record concerning the immunity 
grant to which he had been a witness. Counsel for Defendant made no 
objection to the erroneous remarks made in closing by the prosecutor 
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concerning a grant of immunity. Counsel made objection and argued 
at a bench conference concerning objections to instruction number 
seven (R. 79 at 198-201); however, nothing was put on the record 
concerning the nature of those objections nor the content of the 
arguments at side bar. 
In short, counsel for Defendant vigorously cross-examined 
Brent on the issue of immunity. However, nothing has made it to the 
record concerning the events at preliminary hearing. Mr. Schnoor 
maintains that this is irrelevant, since Gialio puts the burden 
squarely on the government to avoid use of false testimony. The 
defendant has no burden to make sure that the prosecution's 
witnesses testify truthfully. 
However, if this Court views such a record is necessary to 
raise this issue on appeal, then counsel has rendered ineffective 
assistance to Mr. Schnoor. To prevail on an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim, 
[f]irst, the defendant must show that counsel's 
performance was deficient. This requires a 
showing that counsel made errors so serious that 
counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. 
Second, the defendant must show that the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 
This requires showing that counsel's errors were 
so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair 
trial, a trial whose result was unreliable. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
There is no trial strategy that would dictate a vigorous 
but basically ineffective cross-examination of a lying or forgetful 
witness and then to not argue before the court and out of the jury's 
- 15 -
presence. No further attention to the problem would be drawn by 
asking for a continuance to get a tape as evidence or by proffering 
a statement of the facts at preliminary hearing and arguing Gialio 
at that point to the court. No trial tactic would get in the way of 
putting on the record objections to instruction number seven. 
The performance of Mr. Schnoor's counsel was deficient. He 
could have mitigated the impact of the false testimony by providing 
the jury with a tape or a transcript of the preliminary hearing. A 
continuance to accomplish this appears nowhere in the record. This 
alone would not serve to completely set things right. That could be 
accomplished only by the prosecutor conceding to the jury that 
immunity had been granted, followed by appropriate instruction from 
the trial court. However, defense counsel makes insufficient effort 
to set these things in motion. 
By not doing what he could have done to correct the false 
impression left in the jurors' minds concerning the credibility of 
the main witness against Mr. Schnoorf defense counsel's performance 
prejudiced the defense. The court in Gialio points out that this 
type of false testimony creates an almost insurmountable problem. 
405 U.S. at 154-55; Napue at 269. 
If this conviction can be obtained through false 
information concerning such important matters of credibility as the 
immunity from prosecution of the State's main witness, then the 
system itself is subverted. It does not matter if this Court places 
the burden for this violation of due process upon the prosecution 
for allowing and arguing this false testimony or upon the counsel 
- 16 -
for Defendant for not completely pointing out the problem to the 
judge or preserving the issue for appeal. The jury could settle the 
matter only by making judgments on the credibility of Mr. Schnoor, 
Brent and Brenda. They had false information concerning Brent's 
credibility. The resulting jury verdict could not have been 
reliable; the trial could not have been a fair one. (See Point I.C 
for further argument on reversibility of the error.) 
C. THE USE OF FALSE EVIDENCE IN THIS TRIAL 
CONSTITUTED REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
A conviction obtained through the use of false evidence 
must be reversed, 
if there is any reasonable likelihood that the 
false testimony could have affected the judgment 
of the jury. 
Walker, 624 P.2d 687, 690-91 (Utah 1981). Therefore, a reasonable 
likelihood or probability 
is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome. 
State v. Kniaht, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1982), quoting Strickland 
at 694. Furthermore, this standard 
focuses on the taint caused by the error. If the 
taint is sufficient, it is irrelevant that there 
is sufficient untainted evidence to support a 
verdict. Any stricter interpretation of [this 
standard] . . . runs the risk of substituting 
[the court's] judgment for that of the jury and 
could be criticized as encouraging the improper 
admission of evidence by de facto weakening the 
sanctions against it. (citation omitted) 
State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116, 1122 (Utah 1989). 
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In the present case, only one witness knows the full story 
as to what happened to the check. That witness is Brent Lindsey. 
He was promised immunity from prosecution in exchange for his 
testimony against Mr. Schnoor (R. 3-4, 10-11). Brent's testimony 
implicates Mr. Schnoor and directly contradicts Mr. Schnoor's own 
testimony. That the jury did not know that Brent was protected from 
prosecution because he testified creates an enormous false 
impression, a taint that is more than sufficient to distort the jury 
process. It must be remembered that the jury got this false 
information with considerable embellishment in the form of 
prosecutor objections, argument and a trial court instruction. 
It is immaterial that some of what Brent testified to was 
corroborated by his sister Brenda. She herself had changed her 
story at least once, and her testimony is not without evidence of 
bias. But as the Mitchell opinion points out, even substantial 
corroborating evidence does not remove the taint. No one else could 
corroborate any details that involved Mr. Schnoor. 
The situation is similar in both Gialio and Napue; the 
witness who was promised immunity was the key government witness. 
The false evidence put to the jury had to do with government 
promises and affected not facts of the crime, but merely the 
credibility of those witnesses. In both instances, the convictions 
were reversed, because 
[t]he jury's estimate of the truthfulness and 
reliability of a given witness may well be 
determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is 
upon such subtle factors as the possible interest 
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of the witness in testifying falsely that a 
defendant's life or liberty may depend. 
Napue at 269. 
Mr. Schnoor's conviction should be reversed, because it was 
obtained with the use of false information. 
POINT II. NUMEROUS ACTS OF PROSECUTORIAL 
MISCONDUCT DENIED MR. SCHNOOR THE RIGHT TO A FAIR 
TRIAL. 
When a prosecutor makes improper statements in opening or 
closing, engages in inappropriate cross-examination, or fails to act 
as fairness dictates, he is violating his "duty to see that justice 
is done." Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687, 691 (Utah 1981). 
Thus, while he should prosecute with earnestness 
and vigor, it is as much his duty to refrain from 
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful 
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means 
to bring about a just one. (citations omitted) 
Id. 
There is a two-part test to see if the objectionable 
actions of the prosecutor warrant reversal of the conviction. First 
of all, 
did the remarks call to the attention of the 
jurors matters which they would not be justified 
in considering in determining their verdict. 
State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984), citing State v. 
Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (Utah 1973). And secondly, 
were they, under the circumstances of the 




A. ALL REMARKS DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE FALSE 
TESTIMONY CONCERNING IMMUNITY WERE IMPROPER. 
As outlined in Point I above, the State's main witness 
testified falsely and the State made no effort to correct the false 
testimony. Instead of correcting the false impression created by 
this testimony, the prosecutor made objections that suggested the 
defense, not the State, was acting in bad faith (R. 79 at 44) and 
then vigorously argued in closing this lack of immunity from 
prosecution for its star witness (R. 79 at 206 and 214-15). Even 
though the prosecutor was not present for the granting of immunity, 
his inaction is reversible error (see Point I above); however, his 
vigorous pursuit of this testimony without having verified his 
information is misconduct. Defense counsel's repeated attempts to 
elicit the information and the content of the unrecorded bench 
conferences should have warned the prosecutor to check his 
information. 
In State v. Walker, the Utah Supreme Court reversed a 
conviction, because false testimony went to the jury from the 
State's main witnesses. At some point during the trial, the 
prosecutor became aware of the problem, but refused to correct the 
mistake and in fact argued that mistake in closing. Walker, 624 
P.2d at 690. This case should likewise be reversed. 
B. SEVERAL OF THE PROSECUTOR'S REMARKS IN 
CLOSING ARGUMENT WERE IMPROPER. 
At the very start of closing argument, the prosecutor 
argued as follows: 
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MR. MORGAN: I THINK THAT IN THIS CASE, 
MORE THAN ANY OTHER, I THINK WE HAVE TO CONSIDER 
THAT EVERYONE IN THIS COUNTRY HAS A RIGHT TO BE 
PROTECTED UNDER THE LAW. I THINK MR. SCHNOOR 
DESERVES THAT PROTECTION. 
I THINK THE WITNESSES WHO HAVE TESTIFIED 
IN THIS CASE DESERVE THAT PROTECTION. BRENT 
LINDSEY. AS WELL AS THE DEFENDANT. HAS PUT HIS 
FAITH IN THAT SYSTEM. BRENT LINDSEY. AS YOU 
HEARD HIM TESTIFY AT THE CONCLUSION OF THIS CASE. 
SAID. "NO. I'M NOT AFRAID OF THE DEFENDANT." EVEN 
THOUGH HE TESTIFIED HE WAS THREATENED BY HIM. 
HE SAYS THAT BECAUSE HE HAS PEOPLE AROUND 
HIM THAT WILL PROTECT HIM. I'D LIKE TO THINK THE 
STATE OF UTAH DID IT'S JOB IN PROTECTING BRENT 
LINDSEY AND ALLOWING HIM TO GET UP ON THAT STAND 
AND GIVE HIS STORY. 
NOW THIS IS AS FAR AS I CAN GO. FROM HERE 
ON IT'S UP TO YOU. YOU CAN EITHER LOOK AT THE 
EVIDENCE. COME TO A JUST CONCLUSION AND RENDER A 
VERDICT THAT PROTECTS MR. LINDSEY. OR YOU CAN 
COME TO A CONCLUSION. YOU CAN GET UPSET. YOU CAN 
GET ANGRY ABOUT THINGS THAT REALLY HAVE NOTHING 
TO DO WITH THIS CASE. AND YOU CAN WALK AWAY FROM 
THIS. 
I'M GOING TO BE BACK HERE TOMORROW. SO IS 
MR. GRINDSTAFF, SO IS THE JUDGE. WE'VE LOTS OF 
OTHER CASES. YOU MAY HAVE NOTICED DURING THAT 
TRIAL THAT I GOT PRETTY ANGRY AT TIMES. THIS 
ISN'T A MURDER TRIAL. I'VE DONE MURDER TRIALS 
BEFORE. BUT I DON'T THINK I HAVE SEEN SUCH AN 
IMPORTANT CASE AS THIS FOR A LONG. LONG TIME. 
MR. GRINDSTAFF: I OBJECT TO HIM 
DISCUSSING HIS PERSONAL OPINIONS. AND HIS 
PERSONAL VIEWS. 
THE COURT: OVERRULED. 
MR. MORGAN: IT'S IMPORTANT FOR THAT VERY 
REASON, THAT IN THIS CASE WE HAVE TO DISCUSS 
SOMETHING THAT ONLY JURORS CAN DECIDE. 
(R. 79 at 202-03, emphasis added, entire closing arguments of both 
counsel attached as "Addendum C"). 
This is improper argument for two distinct reasons. First, 
it invites the jurors to make a decision based on a matter 
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extraneous to their deciding guilt or innocence.1 The prosecutor is 
asking them to protect Mr. Lindsey by rendering a guilty verdict. 
He says that if they do not render a guilty verdict, they have 
"walked away" from their duty to protect Brent and have gotten 
"angry about things that have nothing to do with the case." It is 
the prosecutor who is asking them to decide based on things that are 
external to the case. 
Such arguments have been found to be improper in several 
different contexts. Exhortations to take care of the crime problem 
in this country by finding guilt in the particular case is 
improper. Coleman v. State, 617 P.2d 243, 246-47 (Okl. Cr. 1980). 
Pleas to send a message to criminals, the community, or the police 
are improper. Id. at 246. Pleas to take a stand for the whole 
community are improper, also. West v. State, 764 P.2d 528, 529 
(Okl. Cr. 1988) . 
The following argument has been found to be improper by 
this Court: 
Do you want people walking in stores where you 
shop, dressed in that fashion, dangling their 
genitalia and you're going to find them not 
guilty? See, that presumption of innocence just 
went out the window. It's now time for you to 
1. ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice 
(Second Edition 1979) provides in Standard 3-5.8(d) that 
[t]he prosecutor should refrain from argument 
which would divert the jury from its duty to 
decide the case on evidence, by injecting issues 
broader than the guilt or innocence of the 
accused under the controlling law, or by making 
predictions of the consequences of the jury's 
verdict. 
(See Addendum E.) 
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decide, to decide this case. If you want those 
people walking around in your stores where you 
shop, then you're going to find him not guilty. 
If you want to put a stop to it, you're going to 
find him guilty. 
West Valley Citv v. Rislow, 736 P.2d 637, 637 (Utah App. 1987). 
This Court found the suggestion to find guilt based on the jurors' 
feelings about encountering a view of a person's genitalia while in 
public improper. 
This suggestion goes beyond the evidence and 
should not be considered by the jury. 
Rislow at 638. 
In a similar fashion, the prosecutor is asking the jurors 
in the present case to defend Mr. Lindsey from harm and convict 
Mr. Schnoor. That is not the decision they need to make. They need 
to decide whether or not the State has proven Mr. Schnoor's guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. That is all they must decide. The jury 
does not decide its cases based on sending a message on the 
implementation of broad social policies. A jury decides one 
person's guilt or innocence. 
Second, the prosecutor closes this exhortation by saying 
that 
I don't think I have seen such an important case 
as this for a long, long time. 
(R. 79 at 203). This case is important for all involved, in that 
witnesses' credibility are judged and decisions of guilt or 
innocence are made. However, this remark merely emphasizes that the 
prosecutor himself wants the jurors to protect Brent and all other 
witnesses. Personal opinions and beliefs such as this may not be 
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injected by counsel into the case. Grubb v. State, 663 P.2d 750, 
752 (Okl. Cr. 1983). Additionally, this is calculated to inflame 
the jury to act out of improper motive.2 
Finally, the prosecutor argued 
[t]hat defendant is guilty. He's the guiltiest 
defendant that has ever engaged in this 
business. That is a despicable crime, to use 
someone else to commit the crime that you, if you 
had the guts to, would at least commit yourself. 
(R. 79 at 205). This is both impermissible personal opinion and a 
request to find guilt for reasons of policy to punish "despicable" 
people who solicit crimes to be committed. This is improper as 
outlined above. The prosecutor cannot give his personal opinion on 
the guilt or innocence of Mr. Schnoor.3 He could properly argue 
Mr. Schnoor's guilt as a person soliciting the crime, but 
Mr. Schnoor is not more guilty under the law because his 
solicitation has been testified to by Brent. 
These remarks were improper. 
2. Standard 3-5.8(c) (see footnote 1 above) provides that 
[t]he prosecutor should not use arguments 
calculated to inflame the passions or prejudices 
of the jury. 
(See Addendum E.) 
3. Standard 3-5.8(b) (see footnote 1 above) provides that 
[i]t is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor 
to express his or her personal belief or opinion 
as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or 
evidence or the guilt of the defendant. 
(See Addendum E.) 
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C. PROSECUTOR'S CROSS-EXAMINATION OF MR. SCHNOOR 
CONCERNING MR. LORDS WAS IMPROPER. 
During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Mr. Schnoor 
if he thought Mr. Lords, the owner of Mike's Pawns, was telling the 
truth, confused, or mistaken (R. 79 at 174-76, attached as 
"Addendum D"). This is improper because it invades the province of 
the jury to decide issues of credibility, it misleads the jury with 
an improper argument that acquittal can only follow by disbelieving 
the witness mentioned by the cross-examiner, and it is not probative 
being outside of the knowledge of the defendant whether someone else 
is lying, mistaken or confused. State v. Casteneda-Perez, 810 P.2d 
74, 79 (Wash. App. 1991); State v. Flanagan, 801 P.2d 675, 679 (N.M. 
App. 1990). 
In the present case, the questioning on this line was 
persistent and extensive. Several objections by defense counsel 
were overtoiled. Mr. Lords was the only witness besides Brent and 
Brenda to even see Mr. Schnoor in connection with these activities, 
although he saw no criminal conduct on Mr. Schnoor's part. 
This cross-examination further prejudiced the jury against 
Mr. Schnoor with inappropriate argument that urged the jury to deal 
with credibility issues in an improper fashion. The credibility of 
Mr. Schnoor was unfairly commented on by this line of questioning. 
D. THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THESE ERRORS 
AFFECTED THE JURY'S DELIBERATIONS. 
Even if one of these remarks would have been insufficient 
to find reversible error, all of these remarks combined cumulatively 
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constitute fundamental and reversible error. West at 529. The 
credibility of the prosecution's main witness was bolstered with 
improper remarks. Mr. Schnoor#s credibility was attacked by 
improper comment on another witness' veracity. The jury was asked 
to consider improper material outside the evidence and had its 
ability to judge credibility prejudiced with improper jury argument 
during cross. Taken together, these remarks probably, most likely, 
influenced the jury in its decision making. 
If the conclusion of the jurors is based 
on their weighing conflicting evidence, or 
evidence susceptible to differing 
interpretations, there is a greater likelihood 
that they will be improperly influenced through 
remarks of counsel . . . and a small degree of 
influence may be sufficient to affect the verdict. 
Troy at 486. There was no small degree of improper influence 
exerted here. Mr. Schnoor's conviction, based upon a decision on 
his and Brent's credibility, must be reversed because of the 
improper actions of the prosecutor. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his 
conviction and remand this case for a new trial. 
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ADDENDUM A 
D O C K E T ''age 1 
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT - SLC FRIDAY MARCH 30, 1990 
12:36 PM 
Defendant CITATION: SSL Case: 901002110 FS 
Agency No.: 90-1043 
SCHNOOR, THOMAS W State Felony MULTI-DEF 
Judge: Michael L. Hutchings 
NO CDR # FOR THIS CASE 
Violation Date: 01/25/90 
1. FORGERY CHECK OVER $100 76-6-501.21 5000.00 
Plea: Finding/Judgment: Bound over DISTRI 
Proceedings 
02/21/90 Case filed on 02/21/90. MWS 
Warrant ordered MWS 
WARRANT OF ARREST issued - JUDGE PKP MWS 
NEW CHARGES FILED MWS 
Bail amount ordered: MWS 
02/26/90 Warrant recalled on 02/26/90 because Booked PLA 
ARR scheduled for 2/26/90 at 9:30 A in room 1 with MDJ PLA 
Fel Arr Judge Maurice D. Jones PLA 
TAPE: 380 COUNT: 3059 PLA 
Deft present w/o counsel PLA 
ATD None Present ATP K MORGAN PLA 
PRE DSP scheduled for 03/06/90 at 0930 A in room ? with MLH PLA 
Defendant to secure own counsel PLA 
DEFT IN JAIL. KHB 
02/27/90 HUTCHINGS/KHB OFF TAPE DEFT CALLED FROM JAIL AND HAS NOT GOT KHB 
MONEY TO RETAIN COUNSEL, REQ LDA. KHB 
02/28/90 HUTCHINGS/KHB OFF TAPE C/O REFER TO LDA. KHB 
(LDA NOTIFIED) KHB 
03/01/90 ARR scheduled for 3/ 2/90 at 9:30 A in room 1 with MDJ PLA 
03/02/90 ARR on 3/ 2/90 was cancelled PLA 
FILED APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL LDA: CANDICE A JOHNSON LMG 
FILED FORMAL REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY LMG 
03/06/90 HUTCHINGS/DP T449 C1810 DPWC DAVID GRINDSTAFF, MARTY VERHOEF DGP 
PRESENT ON STATES BEHALF. LDA MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL DGP 
GRANTED. C/O PH 3-29-90 AT 2:00 PM. DGP 
DEFT IN PRISON. DGP 
PRE scheduled for 3/29/90 at 2:00 P in room ? with MLH DGP 
03/29/90 Arraignment scheduled on April 09 , 1990 at 09:00 am KHB 
before Judge MICHAEL R. MURPHY in courtroom 304 KHB 
HUTCHINGS/KHB T632 C1073/1123 DPWC DAVID GRINDSTAFF. MARTY KHB 
VERHOEF PRESENT ON BEHALF OF STATE. KHB 
THIS MATTER COMES ON REGULARLY FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING. KHB 
DEFT WAIVES READING OF FORMAL'INFORMATION. KHB 
ON MOTION OF DEFT, COURT INVOKES EXCLUSIONARY RULE. KHB 
WITNESS FOR STATE SW AND TESTIFIED: 1-BRENT LINDSEY KHB 
WITNESS ADVISED AND WAIVED RIGHT TO IMMUNITY. KHB 
FOR THE RECORD, STATE WILL NOT CHARGE WITNESS WITH THE CRIME. KHB 
COURT WILL HOLD THE STATE TO PROMISE CM RECORD. KHB 
STATE EXHIBIT #1 (CHECK) ENTERED.AND RECEIVED INTO EVIDENCE KHB 
CROSS-EXAM KHB 
STATE RESTS KHB 
WITNESS FOR DEFENSE SW AND TESTIFIED: 1-BRENDA LINDSEY KHB 
NO CROSS-EXAM KHB 
DEFT ADVISED AND WAIVED RIGHT TO TESTIFY KHB 
DEFT RESTS KHB 
STATE SUBMITS KHB 
0QG0Q3 
D O C K E T 
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT* - SLC 
Defendant CITATION: 
SCHNOOR, THOMAS W 
r a^ge 2 30, 1990 
12:36 PM 
SSL Case: 901002110 FS 
Agency No.: 90-1043 
State Felony MULTI-DEF 
03/29/90 COURT FINDS PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE DEFT IS CRIMINALLY KHB 
RESPONSIBLE FOR COMMISSION OF THE CRIME. KHB 
C/O BOUND OVER TO THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR ARRAIGNMENT ON KHB 
4-9-90 AT 9:00 A.M. BEFORE JUDGE MICHAEL R. MURPHY. KHB 
EXHIBIT #1 (CHECK) RETURNED TO POSSESSION OF MARTY VERHOEF FOR KHB 
STATE. KHB 
COURT ADMONISHES DEFT TO NOT COMMUNICATE WITH ANY WITNESS, ONLY KHB 
THRU ATTY. KHB 
DEFT IN PRISON. KHB 
03/30/90 Entered case disposition of: TRANSFERRED CPN 
Case transferred to District Court. CAN 
Accounting Summary 
Citation Amount: 5000.00 
Additional Case Data 
Case Disposition 
Disposition. TRANSFERRED DATE: 03/30/90 
Parties 
Atty for Plaintiff 
VERHOEF, MARTY 
Atty for Defendant 
GRINDSTAFF, DAVID 
Work Phone: (801) 363-7900 
Work Phone: (801) 363-1370 
Personal Description 
Sex: M DOB: 02/03/54 
Dr. Lie. No.: 
SCHEDULED HEARING SUMMARY 
ARRAIGNMENT 
PRELIM CALENDAR CALL 
PRELIMINARY HEARING 




0930 A in room 1 with MDJ 
0930 A in room ? with MLH 
0200 P in room ? with MLH 
End of the docket report for this case. 
GQGOCU 
Circuit Court, State of tj-jah 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
Calendar - Log Sheet 
PRELIMINARY HEARING 
Microphone Placement: 
#1 Judge #2 #3 #4 Witness # Lectern 
STATE OF UTAH 
- V S -
CASE NUMBER 
TAPE NUMBER 0> 3*2 
CLERK /K tfuA4i*u*J>;<-> 
90/OOJ//C SS 
thr H A T l i l f / f ^ TIME n u 
JUDGE k^6c40 
DEFENDANT 
COUNSEL FOR STATE ffl'ttfy lMJu/f> 
DEFENSE COUNSEL {/QMciJ &'/^fl4?j£j 
J 
CHARGE: J=TM/U>AJf PJ/jJ? MM */QO 
COUNTER PROCEEDINGS 
. DEFENDANT NOT PRESENT. COURT ORDERED B/W BAIL $ 
. ON MOTION OF COUNSEL, COURT ORDERED CASE DISMISSED 
. ON MOTION OF COUNSEL, COURT ORDERED HEARING CONTINUED TO 
. DEFENDANT ELECTED TO MAKE A STATEMENT UNDER OATH. 
. DEFENDANT ADVISED OF RIGHTS DEFENDANT WAIVED. .RIGHTS. 
. DEFENDANT WAIVED PRELIMINARY HEARING, STATE CONSENTING THERETO, 
. COURT ORDERED DEFENDANT BOUND OVER TO DISTRICT COURT. BAIL 
. UPON STATES MOTION, COURT ORDERED INFORMATION AMENDED TO READ 
. DEFENDANT PLEAD GUILTY TO AMENDED INFORMATION. 
.COURT ORDERED SENTENCE 
. INFORMATION READ WAIVED READING OF INFORMATION // S 2T 
. ON MOTION OF COUNSEL, COURT ORDERED WITNESSES EXCLUDED //VS 
l)jL& /./MstfMo ASA/(f4Lfii faf •dfr^nidJ jjtjJfamjttLeyi mi_ 
7)it 71/1 dJ fiV JjpJbt- <*MJM-Q/*/}#&* 0bf*Jhj4,irnftuiniJjL /M? •t 
\[)ts6/ szbctc* ybhvi*^ Mta 4//Je^wb J?mJ &^ a yojj.^^nu-//*<? 
Will /sUSAt/lt/.irJL^a ./irfi'JPj&fl 
law VJUuf ¥ C&fUjdh QHArtiiil >1.f£*jP.jAs 
*?'/ > '• *- ().». o k •a / ' 
JVr 3& A J^n/i'Ws'id 7/ts.Lt, <J Jd^ic ~)/u7rs<-« Vy ''S M ? 
SLD9 
eoccio 
TAPE NUMBER (f^2 
CASE NUMBER *?0 ! *' 
PAGE NUMBER 5 
? . !C >-. 
COUNTER PROCEEDINGS 
tWf i r/T 'U-JU ?^jhs># 4i1MUf*u^ -; 
! ^10 
A ft J >' -1st >vwic^~ ui7T~n>s?„4 
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LAlh. Sj-'jfe ^r/.M*'/- J}jf- J*^4t>.fiti/?/4**77rJji*f/7 f;/fc*'Z>*sC 
1A *<S* 
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ADDENDUM B 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
Although there is more than one person named in this 
action, the case against each person is separate from and 
independant of that of the other. In this action the only 
defendant on trial is Thomas W. Schnoor. You are not to concern 
yourselves with the status of any other person or defendant named 
in this case. 
G0G022 
ADDENDUM C 
1 NOT IN ANY WAY TO SUGGEST THAT YOU ARE NOT TO CONSIDER 
2 THE BELIEVABILITY OR THE CREDIBILITY OF BRENT AND BRENDA 
3 LINDSEY IN THE SAME MANNER THAT YOU CONSIDER THE 
4 CREDIBILITY OF ANY OTHER WITNESS. 
5 YOU HAVE TO CONSIDER THAT ISSUE. YOU WILL CONSIDER 
6 THAT IN THE SAME WAY AND UNDER THE SAME INSTRUCTIONS AS 
7 YOU WOULD CONSIDER THE CREDIBILITY OF MR. SCHNOOR OR ANY 
8 OTHER WITNESS WHO TESTIFIED HERE. 
9 DOES THAT TAKE CARE OF YOUR PROBLEM? 
10 MR. GRINDSTAFF: MAY I APPROACH THE BENCH? 
11 THE COURT: DOES IT OR DOES IT NOT? 
12 MR. GRINDSTAFF: I BELIEVE IT SHOULD BE A 
13 LITTLE MORE CLEAR. 
14 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. FURTHER OBJECTIONS 
15 OVERRULED. ARE YOU READY FOR CLOSING? 
16 MR. MORGAN: STATE IS, YOUR HONOR. 
17 THE COURT: GO AHEAD, MR. MORGAN. 
18 MR. MORGAN: MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, MR. 
19 GRINDSTAFF, MR. SCHNOOR, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: THIS IS 
20 CLOSING ARGUMENT. 
21 AS MR. GRINDSTAFF STAFF INDICATED EARLIER, I WILL BE 
22 GIVING A STATEMENT OF THE STATE'S CASE, HE WILL BE GIVING 
23 HIS ARGUMENTS THE CASE, AND THEN I WILL BE BACK FOR 
24 REBUTTAL ONE LAST TIME. 
25 I WILL TRY AND BE BRIEF IN REBUTTAL. I WOULD ASK 
201 
1 YOU TO BEAR WITH ME AS I GIVE MY VERSION OF WHAT I THINK 
2 THE STATE HAS SHOWN IN THIS CASE. 
3 I THINK THAT IN THIS CASE, MORE THAN ANY OTHER, I 
4 THINK WE HAVE TO CONSIDER THAT EVERYONE IN THIS COUNTRY 
5 HAS A RIGHT TO BE PROTECTED UNDER THE LAW. I THINK MR. 
6 SCHOOR DESERVES THAT PROTECTION. 
7 I THINK THE WITNESSES WHO HAVE TESTIFIED IN THIS 
8 CASE DESERVE THAT PROTECTION. BRENT LINDSEY, AS WELL AS 
9 THE DEFENDANT, HAS PUT HIS FAITH IN THAT SYSTEM. BRENT 
10 LINDSEY, AS YOU HEARD HIM TESTIFY AT THE CONCLUSION OF 
11 THIS CASE, SAID, "NO, I'M NOT AFRAID OF THE DEFENDANT," 
12 EVEN THOUGH HE TESTIFIED HE WAS THREATENED BY HIM. 
13 HE SAYS THAT BECAUSE HE HAS PEOPLE AROUND HIM THAT 
14 WILL PROTECT HIM. I'D LIKE TO THINK THE STATE OF UTAH 
15 DID IT'S JOB IN PROTECTING BRENT LINDSEY AND ALLOWING HIM 
16 TO GET UP ON THAT STAND AND GIVE HIS STORY. 
17 NOW THIS IS AS FAR AS I CAN GO. FROM HERE ON IT'S 
18 UP TO YOU. YOU CAN EITHER LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE, COME TO 
19 A JUST CONCLUSION AND RENDER A VERDICT THAT PROTECTS MR. 
20 LINDSEY, OR YOU CAN NOT COME TO A CONCLUSION, YOU CAN GET 
21 UPSET, YOU CAN GET ANGRY ABOUT THINGS THAT REALLY HAVE 
22 NOTHING TO DO WITH THIS CASE, AND YOU CAN WALK AWAY FROM 
23 THIS. 
24 I'M GOING TO BE BACK HERE TOMORROW. SO IS MR. 
25 GRINDSTAFF, SO IS THE JUDGE. WE'VE LOTS OF OTHER CASES. 
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1 YOU MAY HAVE NOTICED DURING THAT TRIAL THAT I GOT PRETTY 
2 ANGRY AT TIMES. THIS ISN'T A MURDER TRIAL. I'VE DONE 
3 MURDER TRIALS BEFORE, BUT I DON'T THINK I HAVE SEEN SUCH 
4 AN IMPORTANT CASE AS THIS FOR A LONG, LONG TIME. 
5 MR. GRINDSTAFF: I OBJECT TO HIM DISCUSSING HIS 
6 PERSONAL OPINIONS. AND HIS PERSONAL VIEWS. 
7 THE COURT: OVERRULED. 
S MR. MORGAN: IT'S IMPORTANT FOR THAT VERY 
9 REASON, THAT IN THIS CASE WE HAVE TO DISCUSS SOMETHING 
10 THAT ONLY JURORS CAN DECIDE. 
11 I LIKE TO COME INTO A CASE AND SAY, LADIES AND 
12 GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY, RECONCILE THE FACTS AS FAR AS YOU 
13 CAN, BECAUSE THAT'S WHAT THE INSTRUCTIONS TELL YOU. AND 
14 IN THIS CASE IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN AN APPROPRIATE ARGUMENT 
15 TO COME UP AND SAY, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, WHAT IS GOING 
16 ON HERE IS THAT WE HAVE THE FOLLOWING SITUATION: THERE 
17 IS NO DISPUTE IN THE FACT THAT THE DEFENDANT DROVE BRENT 
18 LINDSEY AROUND. THERE IS NO DISPUTE IN THE FACT THAT 
19 THIS CHECK WAS FORGED. 
20 THERE IS NO DISPUTE IN THIS CASE THAT THAT CHECK WAS 
21 CUT OFF. THERE IS NO DISPUTE IN THE FACTS THAT THIS AND 
22 THAT AND THAT, AND YOU CAN SEE THAT ALL FOR YOURSELVES. 
23 YOU'RE VERY INTELLIGENT PEOPLE, WE CAN SEE THAT. 
24 BUT THE ONLY DISPUTE IN THIS CASE HAS TO BE WHETHER OR 
25 NOT THE DEFENDANT KNEW, AND I BELIEVE YOU CAN COME TO THE 
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1 CONCLUSION THAT HE KNEW WHAT WAS GOING ON. 
2 AND, THEREFORE, HE IS A PARTY TO THE OFFENSE. BUT 
3 THIS ISN'T SUCH A CASE. IN THIS CASE SOMEBODY IS LYING. 
4 AND IT'S EITHER THE DEFENDANT, WHO HAS GIVEN HIS 
5 UNLUCKIEST DAY OF HIS LIFE SPEECH, OR IT'S BRENT AND 
6 BRENDA LINDSEY. AND ONLY JURORS CAN MAKE THAT DECISION. 
7 AND WHEN YOU COME BACK TO FACE MR. SCHNOOR IN THIS 
8 CASE, YOU'RE GOING TO HAVE THE TOUGHEST JOB OF YOUR LIFE, 
9 BECAUSE YOU'RE GOING TO HAVE TO SAY WHETHER OR NOT HE 
10 TOLD THE TRUTH. THAT'S WHAT THIS CASE COMES DOWN TO. 
11 FROM THE STATE'S PERSPECTIVE, THE EVIDENCE IN THIS 
12 CASE SHOWS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE DEFENDANT 
13 ENGAGED BRENT LINDSEY TO CASH A $300 CHECK, NOT ONCE, BUT 
14 TWICE, ON JANUARY 25, L989. FIRST, AT MIKE'S PAWN, THEN 
15 AGAIN AT CASH-A-CHECK. 
16 THE DEFENDANT'S CLEAR INTENT IN THIS CASE WAS TO 
17 PLACE ALL THE RISK OF BEING CAUGHT ON BRENT LINDSEY AND 
18 OBTAIN ALL THE BENEFIT OF THE CRIMINAL ACT, AND HE DID 
19 THAT BECAUSE HE'S A CRIMINAL. 
20 BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT KNEW THAT THE CHECK WAS NOT 
21 AUTHORIZED FOR PAYMENT AND HE KNEW IT BECAUSE THAT CHECK 
22 CAME FROM THE VERY BUSINESS HE HE WORKED AT. THE 
23 DEFENDANT KNEW THAT BRENT WAS HANDICAPPED. HE KNEW THAT 
24 HE WAS A JUVENILE AND I CAN'T NOT APPRECIATE THE RISK 
25 PERPETRATING A CRIME FOR A MERE $350. COULD GET HIM 
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1 THROWN IN PRISON. 
2 HE KNEW THE RISK OF BRENT GETTING CAUGHT WAS 
3 EXTREMELY HIGH. HE KNEW THAT THE OFFENSE WAS WITNESSED 
4 ONLY BY BRENT AND HIS SISTER, AND THAT THEIR CREDIBILITY 
5 WOULD BE IN QUESTION. 
6 HE KNEW THAT THE CRIME ITSELF WOULD BE WITNESSED BY 
7 A NUMBER OF PEOPLE. AND HE KNEW, UNLIKE BRENDA, HE KNEW 
8 WHY THOSE SCISSORS WERE GOING TO BE USED ON THAT CHECK. 
9 LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY, THAT DEFENDANT IS 
10 GUILTY. HE'S THE GUILTIEST DEFENDANT THAT HAS EVER 
11 ENGAGED IN THIS BUSINESS. THAT IS A DESPICABLE CRIME, TO 
12 USE SOMEONE ELSE TO COMMIT THE CRIME THAT YOU, IF YOU HAD 
13 THE GUTS TO, WOULD AT LEAST COMMIT YOURSELF. 
14 THE DEFENDANT WOULD HAVE YOU BELIEVE THAT THIS CASE 
15 TURNS ON THE CREDIBILITY OF BRENT LINDSEY. THE STATE 
16 WOULD HAVE YOU BELIEVE THAT THE TRIAL, INSTEAD, IS BASED 
17 ON THE CORROBORATION OF BRENT LINDSEY'S STATEMENTS, AND 
18 YOU HAVE SEEN THAT CORROBORATION. 
19 YOU HAVE SEEN THE CHECK; THAT CORROBORATES IT. YOU 
20 HAVE HEARD THE TESTIMONY OF JACK LORDS; THAT CORROBORATES 
21 IT. YOU HAVE HEARD THE HAD TESTIMONY OF LINDA YOUNG; 
22 THAT CORROBORATES IT. AND THERESA DEMIK. 
23 ALL OF THOSE WITNESSES, WHEN YOU RECONCILE THOSE 
24 FACTS AND PUT THEM TOGETHER, YOU CAN SEE POINT BY POINT 
25 BY POINT BY POINT THAT EVERYTHING SUPPORTS BRENT'S 
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1 VERSION OF WHAT OCCURRED HERE. AND NOTHING SUPPORTS THE 
2 DEFENDANTS VERSION. 
3 KEEP IN MIND, I WOULD ASK YOU, THAT BRENT IS NOT ON 
4 TRIAL. THAT IS FOR ANOTHER DAY. THE DEFENDANT IS ON 
5 TRIAL. IT IS HIS CREDIBILITY THAT I WOULD SUGGEST IS 
6 REALLY IN ISSUE IN THIS CASE. THAT IS REALLY THE ISSUE. 
7 DON'T LET US DOWN. RENDER A TRUE AND JUST VERDICT. 
8 THANK YOU. 
9 THE COURT: THANK YOU, MR. MORGAN. 
10 MR. GRINDSTAFF? 
11 MR. GRINDSTAFF: LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: YOU'RE 
12 HERE BECAUSE THERE IS A GREAT DISPUTE AS TO WHAT TOOK 
13 PLACE ON JANUARY 25TH. WE HAVE A LEARNING DISABILITY 
14 JUVENILE. AND WE'VE A SISTER WHO BELIEVES THAT THEY HAVE 
15 COMMITTED NO CRIMES. 
16 SHE SAID THAT SHE WAS GUILTY OF NOTHING. HER 
17 BROTHER WAS GUILTY OF NOTHING. OBVIOUSLY, A LEARNING 
18 DISABILITY PERSON CAN COMMIT CRIMES. A LEARNING DISABLED 
19 PERSON IS JUST AS ABLE TO COMMIT A CRIME OF FORGERY AS 
20 ANYONE ELSE IS. 
21 AND THERE IS NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT HE COULDN'T 
22 HAVE AND THAT HE DIDN'T. WHAT YOU NEED TO LOOK AT IS NOT 
23 ONLY THE FACTS HERE, BUT THE EVIDENCE THAT ISN'T BROUGHT 
24 FORTH. 
25 MR. MORGAN: OJECTION. YOUR HONOR, THAT IS A 
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1 WE ALL HAVE, OR MOST OF US PROBABLY HAVE BROTHERS 
2 ON SISTERS. IF SOMETHING SERIOUS HAS HAPPENED TO ONE OF 
3 YOUR BROTHERS ON SISTERS, IT'S REALLY EASY, I WOULD 
4 SUBMIT, TO GET SOMEONE, A BROTHER OR A SISTER, TO HAVE 
5 THE BROTHER OR SISTER LIE FOR YOU. 
6 HER STORY COMES OUT THREE WEEKS LATER, ON THIS 
7 WRITTEN DOCUMENT, STATE'S EXHIBIT THREE. THREE WEEKS 
8 LATER. IF THAT STORY WAS A CORRECT STORY, WHY DIDN'T SHE 
9 REVEAL THAT TO THE POLICE AT THE TIME? WHY DIDN'T SHE 
10 SAY, "THIS IS WHAT HAPPENED, WHY DOES SHE WAIT 3 WEEKS TO 
11 COME UP WITH HER STORY? 
12 BRENT AND BRENDA BOTH TESTIFIED THEY DIDN'T DISCUSS 
13 THIS CASE. THEY DIDN'T DISCUSS THE TESTIMONY. YOU HAVE 
14 BRENT, WHO FACES A POSSIBLE LONG TERM DETENTION. HE'S 
15 ADMITED THAT HE FORGED THE CHECK. 
16 MR. MORGAN: YOUR HONOR, I'M GOING TO MOVE TO 
17 STRIKE THAT LAST STATEMENT. THERE IS NO TESTIMONY THAT 
IS BRENT FACES A LONG TERM DETENTION. IN FACT, THAT 
19 TESTIMONY IS TO THE CONTRARY. 
20 THE COURT: WELL, I BELIEVE THERE WAS SOME 
21 TESTIMONY OF MR. SCHNOOR TO THAT EFFECT. IT MAY NOT HAVE 
22 COME FROM THE BRENT, BUT IT MAY COME FROM BRENDA. I'M 
23 GOING TO OVERRULE THE OBJECTION BECAUSE OF MY MEMORY OF 
24 THE TESTIMONY. 
25 MR. GRINDSTAFF: YOU'RE INSTRUCTED TO LOOK AT 
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1 AND ANOTHER PERSON ANOTHER STORY, THEN CAN YOU CAN LOOK 
2 AT HER AND SAY, "WELL, SHE WILL LIE- SHE WON'T BE 
3 TRUTHFUL." 
4 IF YOU LOOK AT THIS CASE AND ALL THE EVIDENCE AND 
5 THE LACK OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED, YOU WILL HAVE TO FOLLOW 
6 THE JUDGE'S INSTRUCTION WHERE IT STATE'S THAT IF THERE IS 
7 A REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO THE EVIDENCE, YOU MUST FIND THE 
8 DEFENDANT NOT GUILTY. THANK YOU. 
9 THE COURT: THANK YOU, MR. GRINDSTAFF. 
10 MR. MORGAN? 
11 MR. MORGAN: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. ONCE 
12 AGAIN, MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, MR. GRINDSTAFF, LADIES 
13 AND GENTLEMENO OF THE JURY. I HAVE BEEN SITTING HERE FOR 
14 QUITE SOME TIME, YOU HAVE BEEN SITTING HERE FOR QUITE 
15 SOME TIME, AND I'LL KEEP MY PROMISE TO BE BRIEF. 
16 MY COMPLIMENTS TO MR. GRINDSTAFF. HE IS DONE A VERY 
17 PROFESSIONAL JOB IN THIS CASE, AND HE HAS PRESENTED 
18 DEFENDANT'S CASE AS BEST HE COULD UNDER THE 
19 CIRCUMSTANCES. AND I DO NOT MEAN TO DISPARAGE HIM. 
20 HOWEVER, I DO TAKE ISSUE WITH A NUMBER OF THINGS 
21 THAT HE IS BROUGHT OUT IN HIS CASE. AS ABLE COUNSEL HE 
22 RAISES THE ISSUE OF FINGERPRINTS FOR THE FIRST TIME NOW, 
23 WHEN HE HAS HAD EQUAL ACCESS TO THE TESTING AND THE 
24 EVIDENCE AS THE STATE DOES. 
25 AND NOW HIS CASE NO LONGER TURNS UPON THE PIVITOL 
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1 TESTIMONY OF ATTACKING THE CORROBORATION, BUT TURNS ON 
2 WHETHER OR NOT THIS PIECE OF PAPER HAS THE DEFENDANT'S 
3 FINGERPRINTS ON IT. WELL, THAT WAS NEVER BROUGHT UP 
4 UNTIL CLOSING ARGUMENT, AND THAT GIVES THE STATE CAUSE 
5 FOR CONCERN. 
6 THE NEXT ISSUE THAT MR. GRINDSTAFF RAISES IS THAT 
7 THIS WHOLE CASE SHOULD BE THROWN OUT BECAUSE HE FINDS 
8 FROM THE DEFENDANT'S POINT OF VIEW THAT BRENT AND BRENDA 
9 LINDSEY ARE NOT CREDIBLE. HE DOESN'T TALK ABOUT THE 
10 CREDIBILITY OF JACK LORDS. 
11 HE DOESN'T TALK ABOUT THE CREDIBILITY OF THERESA 
12 DEMIK, HE DID NOT TALK ABOUT THE CREDIBILITY OF LINDA 
13 YOUNG, BUT HE DOES TALK ABOUT THE TESTIMONY THAT THE 
14 DEFENDANT DISPUTES ALL THE WAY DOWN THE LINE HERE. 
15 ALL RIGHT. HE SAYS THIS FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS, 
16 AS I UNDERSTAND IT: BROTHERS AND SISTERS TEND TO LIE FOR 
17 EACH OTHER. WELL, BROTHERS AND SISTERS ALSO TEND TO TELL 
18 THE TRUTH FOR EACH OTHER. 
19 BRENT IS GOING TO DETENTION IF THERE'S A SHOWING HE 
20 DIRECTLY COMMITTED AN OFFENSE, SO THEREFORE, BRENDA IS 
21 BIASED. ALL RIGHT. BECAUSE HE'S GOING TO GO TO JUVENILE 
22 COURT. NOW, HIS TESTIMONY WAS THAT HE WAS NOT PROMISED 
23 ANYTHING, BUT BY ADMITTING HIS PARTICIPATION IN THIS 
24 CRIME, THEREFORE, HE'S GOING TO DETENTION? THEREFORE, HE 
25 IS GETTING UP AND TESTIFYING THAT HE IN FACT COMMITTED A 
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1 CRIME. 
2 NOW, WHERE IS THE LOGIC THERE? BECAUSE EVERYTHING 
3 THAT BRENT SAYS, HE SAYS THAT I AM GUILTY OF CASHING THIS 
4 FORGED CHECK, AND I KNEW EXACTLY WHAT I WAS DOING. DOES 
5 THE PART WHERE HE SAID YES HE GOT FIFTY BUCKS FOR IT MAKE 
6 HIM A LIAR? IT DOESN'T. HE INCRIMINATES HIMSELF ALL THE 
7 AWAY THROUGH THE CASE. 
S SO THAT BIAS IS MISGUIDED. "THE STATE IS OUT TO GET 
9 SOMEBODY. STATE'S GUYS ARE MEAN PEOPLE." THEN HE SAYS, 
10 "BRENT IS THE MASTERMIND, ALONG WITH BRENDA, WHO NOT ONLY 
11 CONCOCTED THE CRIME, BUT HE CONCOCTED THE STORY THAT 
12 IMPLICATES THE DEFENDANT." 
13 REMEMBER BRENT? IS THIS THE SAME GUY THAT THE STATE 
14 OBSERVED ON THE WITNESS STAND, WHO PUT TOGETHER THIS 
15 MULTIPLE FORGERY AND TRICKING MR. SCHNOOR INTO DRIVING 
16 HIM AROUND TOWN, CONCEALING THIS CHECK, THEN SUDDENLY 
17 WHEN HE GETS CAUGHT HE HAS THE PRESENCE OF MIND TO GO 
18 IMPLICATE THE DEFENDANT TO GET OUT OF THIS, AND OFFER HIS 
19 TESTIMONY IN EXCHANGE FOR NOT GOING THROUGH DETENTION? 
20 OKAY. IF SCISSORS ARE RELEVANT, AS MR. GRINDSTAFF 
21 BROUGHT OUT, THERE IS SOMETHING VERY INTERESTING GOING ON 
22 HERE. NOW, BRENDA TESTIFIES THAT SHE DOES NOT KNOW WHAT 
23 THE SCISSORS ARE BEING USED FOR. THEREFORE, BRENDA IS 
24 LYING. AND BRENDA LIED ON THAT, THEN NONE OF HER 
25 TESTIMONY SHOULD BE BELIEVED; RIGHT? 
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1 WELL, LET'S THINK ABOUT THAT. IF THE SCISSORS WERE 
2 USED AT ALL, THEY WERE REQUESTED BY THE DEFENDANT AND 
3 EVEN THOUGH SHE DIDN'T KNOW ABOUT THEM, THEN THAT 
4 IMPLICATES THE DEFENDANT. 
5 NOW, WHICH IS IT? IS SHE TELLING THE TRUTH, OR IS 
6 SHE LYING? WHY IS SHE BRINGING UP THE SCISSORS AND LYING 
7 ABOUT HER KNOWLEDGE ABOUT IT. YOU KNOW, EITHER SHE'S TOO 
8 CONSISTENT OR SHE'S INCONSISTENT; I'M NOT SURE WHICH. 
9 THERE IS A SMOKING GUN IN THIS CASE. REMEMBER, THE 
10 DEFENDANT TESTIFIED THAT THE REASON THAT THEY LEFT MIKE'S 
11 PAWN SHOP AND WENT HOME WITHOUT GETTING THE CHECK CASHED 
12 IS BECAUSE HE ASSUMED THAT THE ATTEMPT WAS UNSUCCESSFUL 
13 BECAUSE BRENT HAD FORGOTTEN HIS I.D. 
14 NOW, THEY GO HOME, AND HE SAYS THAT HE NEVER SAW 
15 THIS CHECK. HE SAYS THAT HE NEVER CUT OFF THE CHECK. 
16 AND HE NEVER SAW IT DURING THIS ENTIRE TIME. NOW, HE'S 
17 AT HOME, AND NOT SEEING THIS CHECK, HE FORGETS HIS I.D. 
IS AND HOME THEY GO TO BRENT LINDSEY'S HOUSE, NOT AT HIS, 
19 WERE HIS I.D. IS. BUT HE DOES NOT GO BACK TO MIKE'S PAWN 
20 WITH THE I.D.. HE CLEARLY KNOWS AT THIS POINT THAT THE 
21 REASON HE COULDN'T CASH THE CHECK IS BECAUSE HE DOESN'T 
22 HAVE HIS I.D., BECAUSE HE ASSUMED HE LEFT IT AT HOME. 
23 INSTEAD OF GOING TO MIKE'S PAWN, HE MAKES THREE 
24 PHONE CALLS TO PLACES OTHER THAN MIKE'S PAWN, AND THEN HE 
25 SAYS, "LET'S GO TO CASH A CHECK." ALL HE'S GOT TO DO IS 
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1 GET THE CHECK. HE SAYS, "DON'T FORGET YOUR I.D." BUT 
2 "DON'T FORGET YOUR I.D." TO GO BACK TO MIKE'S? NO. 
3 "DON'T FORGET YOUR I.D. BECAUSE WE ARE GOING TO CASH 
4 A CHECK", AFTER HE CHECKED ANOTHER THREE PLACES. IF HE 
5 DIDN'T SEE THE CHECK, IF HE DIDN'T CUT IT OFF, IF HE 
6 DIDN'T PUT BRENT UP TO THIS, WHY DIDN'T HE GO BACK TO 
7 MIKE'S PAWN? BECAUSE HE'S GUILTY. 
8 THANK YOU. 
9 THE COURT: THANK MR. MORGAN. MR. UNSWORTH, 
10 WILL YOU STEP FORTH AND BE SWORN. 
11 (WHEREUPON, BAILIFF IS SWORN BY CLERK.) 
12 THE COURT: MEMBERS OF THE JURY, CONTRARY TO 
13 EACH OF THE THE OTHER TIMES WHEN YOU LEFT THE COURTROOM, 
14 I'M NOT NOT GOING TO INSTRUCT YOU NOT TO DISCUSS THIS 
15 MATTER. IN FACT I'M GOING TO INSTRUCT YOU JUST THE 
16 CONTRARY, THAT YOU ARE TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER, BUT ONLY 
17 AMONG YOURSELVES. 
18 MR. UNSWORTH WILL ACCOMPANY YOU BACK TO THE JURY 
19 ROOM AND YOU WILL BEGIN YOUR DELIBERATIONS. HE'LL BE 
20 CHECKING WITH YOU IN TEN OR FIFTEEN MINUTES TO SEE IF YOU 
21 WOULD LIKE LUNCH BROUGHT IN TO YOU. IF SO, WE'LL SEND 
22 MENUES IN, AND YOU CAN CHECK OFF WHAT YOU WANT. 
23 IF FOR ANY REASON YOU NEED TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE 
24 COURT OR ANYONE ON THE OUTSIDE, WHAT YOU SHOULD DO IS 
25 WRITE A NOTE TO THE BAILIFF, AND HE WILL EITHER TAKE CARE 
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ADDENDUM D 
1 G. WERE YOU PRETTY CLOSE TO HIM, OR WERE YOU AT 
2 THE TIME? 
3 A. I WAS TRYING TO GET CLOSE. HE'S BEEN A HARD 
4 CHILD TO GET A HOLD — OR CLOSE TO. 
5 0. WERE YOU AT LEAST CLOSE ENOUGH TO PICK HIM UP 
6 AT WORK AND HELP HIM CASH HIS CHECK?? 
7 A. I WOULD HELP HIM OUT ANY WAY I COULD. IF HE 
8 ASKED ME TO HELP HIM CASH A CHECK, I COULD HAVE AND WOULD 
9 HAVE. 
10 0. WHY DIDN'T YOU TELL HIM THAT? 
11 A. HE DIDN'T ASK ME FOR HELP, OTHER THAN IF I 
12 KNEW A PLACE THAT HE COULD CASH THE CHECK AT. 
13 0. BRENT DIDN'T ASK YOU TO DRIVE HIM THERE, DID 
14 HE? 
15 A. I JUST HAD HIM WITH ME. HE JUST ASKED ME. 
16 HE ASKED ME AFTERWORDS IF I WOULD DROP HIM OFF, YOU KNOW, 
17 AND I TOLD HIM I WOULD WAIT. BUT HE WANTED TO — SO — 
18 O. YOU HEARD MR. LORDS TESTIMONY THAT HE SERVED 
19 BRENT AND THAT HE RECALLS VERY DISTINCTLY THAT HE IS THE 
20 ONE THAT TOOK^THE CHECK FROM BRENT ON THAT OCCASION AND 
21 IT WAS MISSPELLED ON THE BACK? 
22 A. YES, I DID HEAR MR. LORDS SAY THAT. 
23 0. IS THAT DIFFERENT WHAT THAN WHAT YOU'RE 
24 TELLING THE JURY NOW? IT IS, ISN'T IT? 
25 A. YES. BUT — WHAT I DO REMEMBER IS MR. LORDS 
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1 HELPING ME, AND DANNY HELPING BRENT. 
2 Q. SO JACK IS NOT TELLING THE TRUTH? 
3 A. I AM SURE JACK IS TELLING WHAT HE CAN 
4 REMEMBER. 
5 0. WELL, A MISSPELLED CHECK, THAT WAS AN UNUSUAL 
6 OCCURRENCE, ISN'T IT? 
7 A. AWE, I — 
8 MR. GRINDSTAFF: OBJECTION. YOUR HONOR, I 
9 DON'T THINK IT'S RELEVANT. 
10 THE COURT: OVERRULED. IT'S CROSS-EXAMINATION. 
11 Q. (BY MR. MORGAN) WOULDN'T YOU AGREE THAT A 
12 PERSON WHO ENDORSES A CHECK MADE OUT TO HIM AND MISSPELLS 
13 THEIR OWN NAME IS AN UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE? 
14. A. YES. 
15 0. AND WOULDN'T YOU REMEMBER THE PERSON WHO 
16 PRESENTED YOU A CHECK AND MISSPELLED HIS OWN NAME? 
17 MR. GRINDSTAFF: OBJECTION, ASKING FOR 
18 CONJECTURE. 
19 THE COURT: OVERRULED. 
20 A. YES. 
21 0. SO WHY DO YOU THINK JACK LORDS IS CONFUSED? 
22 A. I DON'T THINK IT'S — 
23 MR. GRINDSTAFF: OBJECTION, I DON'T THINK HE 
24 HAS THE— 
25 THE COURT: SUSTAINED. 
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1 0. (BY MR. MORGAN) WHY, UNDER THESE 
2 CISCUMSTANCES, DO YOU BELIEVE THAT JACK LORDS IS 
3 MISTAKEN? 
4 A. I BELIEVE— 
5 MR. GRINDSTAFF: I DON'T THINK IT'S RELEVANT. 
6 WHAT HIS OPINION IS AS TO JACK LORDS — 
7 THE COURT: I'M GOING THE SUSTAIN THE 
8 OBJECTION. 
9 0. (BY MR. MORGAN) IT'S YOUR TESTIMONY THAT 
10 BRENT HELPED YOU OUT WITH THE TV?? 
11 A. YES. 
12 Q. YOU HEARD BRENDA LINDSEY'S TESTIMONY THAT YOU 
13 BROUGHT THE TV OUT ALONE? 
14 A. YES, I DID. 
15 O. YOU HEARD JACK LORDS' TESTIMONY THAT YOU WERE 
16 OVER WITH THE TV, AND BRENT IS OVER CASHING THE CHECK? 
17 A. YES. 
18 Q. AND BY YOUR OWN TESTIMONY, YOU'RE AT LEAST A 
19 COUNTER AWAY WITH THE STEREOS? 
20 A. THAT'S RIGHT. 
21 Q. YES. 
22 O. AT WHAT POINT DID YOU ASK BRENT TO HELP YOU 
23 OUT WITH THE TV? 
24 A. WHEN I WAS GETTING READY TO LEAVE AND HE WAS 
25 STANDING THERE WAITING TO LEAVE, SO I ASKED HIM, "ARE YOU 
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ADDENDUM E 
THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION Standard 3-5.9 
of such evidence, it should be tendered by an offer of proof and a ruling 
obtained. 
Standard 3-5.7 Examination of Witnesses 
(a) The interrogation of all witnesses should be conducted fairly, 
objectively, and with due regard for the dignity and legitimate privacy of 
the witness, and without seeking to intimidate or humiliate the witness 
unnecessarily. Proper cross-examination can be conducted without vio-
lating rules of decorum. 
(b) The prosecutor's brief that the witness is telling the truth does 
not preclude cross-examination, but may affect the method and scope of 
cross-examination. A prosecutor should not use the power of cross-
examination to discredit or undermine a witness if the prosecutor knows 
the witness is testifying truthfully. 
(c) A prosecutor should not call a witness who the prosecutor knows 
will claim a valid privilege not to testify for the purpose of impressing 
upon the jury the fact of the claim of privilege. In some instances, as 
defined in codes of professional responsibility, doing so will constitute 
unprofessional conduct. 
(d) It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to ask a question 
which implies the existence of a factual predicate for which a good faith 
belief is lacking. 
Standard 3-5.8 Argument to the Jury 
(a) The prosecutor may argue all reasonable inferences from evidence 
in the record. It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor intentional-
ly to misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may 
draw. 
(b) It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to express his or 
her personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony 
or evidence or the guilt of the defendant. 
(c) The prosecutor should not use arguments calculated to inflame 
the passions or prejudices of the jury. 
(d) The prosecutor should refrain from argument which would divert 
the jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence, by injecting 
issues broader than the guilt or innocence of the accused under the 
controlling law, or by making predictions of the consequences of the 
jury's verdict. 
Standard 3-5.9 Facts Outside the Record 
It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor intentionally to refer 
to or argue on the basis of facts outside the record whether at trial or on 
appeal, unless such facts are matters of common public knowledge based 
on ordinary human experience or matters of which the court may take 
judicial notice. 
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AMENDMENTS Amend. XIV, § 3 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection.] the Confederacy and claims not 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pointment.] 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
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Art. I, § 6 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Mootness Ques-
tion in Habeas Corpus Proceedings Where Pe-
titioner Is Released Prior to Final Adjudica-
tion, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 265. 
Habeas Corpus and the In-Service Conscien-
tious Objector, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 328. 
Post-Conviction Procedure Act: Limitation 
on Habeas Corpus?, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 595. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Cor-
pus §§ 5 to 7. 
C.J.S. — 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law 
§ 472 et seq.; 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 5. 
A.L.R. — Anticipatory relief in federal 
courts against state criminal prosecutions 
growing out of civil rights activities, 8 
A.L.R.3d 301. 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law *=» 
83(1), 121 to 123. 
Sec, 6. [Right to bear arms.] 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and 
defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful 
purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legisla-
ture from defining the lawful use of arms. 
History: Const 1896; L. 1984 (2nd S.S.), 
I.J.R. 3. 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1983, Senate 
Joint Resolution No. 2, proposing to amend 
this section, was repealed by Senate Joint Res-
olution No. 3, Laws 1984 (2nd S.S.), § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Prospective application. 
Regulation of right to bear arms. 
Prospective application. 
The amendment to this provision by Laws 
1984 (2nd S.S.), Senate Joint Resolution No. 3 
is to be given prospective application only. 
State v. Wacek, 703 P.2d 296 (Utah 1985). 
Regulation of right to bear arms. 
This section gives sufficient authority for the 
legislature to forbid the possession of danger-
ous weapons by those who are not citizens, or 
who have been convicted of crimes, or who are 
addicted to drugs, or who are mentally incom-
petent. State v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813 (Utah 
1974). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Individual Right 
to Bear Arms: An Illusory Public Pacifier?, 
1986 Utah L. Rev. 751. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons 
and Firearms § 4. 
C.J.S. — 16A CJ.S. Constitutional Law 
§ 511; 94 CJ.S. Weapons § 2. 
A.L.R. — Gun control laws, validity and 
construction of, 28 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Validity of statute proscribing possession or 
carrying of knife, 47 A.L.R.4th 651. 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law *» 82; 
Weapons *=> 1, 3, 6 et seq. 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law,] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
History: Const. 1896. 
Cross-References. — Eminent domain gen-
erally, § 78-34-1 et seq. 
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